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What lies Before, Behind and Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on 
Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal Education 
PEER ZUMBANSEN 
Abstract: 
The following paper serves as the Epilogue to an edited volume that celebrates the first 
decade of McGill’s ambitious legal education reform in ‘Transsystemic Law‘. Placing this 
innovation in a larger context of curriculum reform, law school crisis – then and now -, it 
becomes apparent that McGill’s program can be seen as part of global changes in the way 
that law schools struggle with student expectations, market demands, and shifting 
frameworks of domestic and transnational lawyering. Karl Llewellyn’s observations “On 
What is Wrong With Legal Education“ ring true still today, almost eighty years later. Still we 
seek ways to inspire law students to think critically and to develop a sense for their own 
moral compass, and still we find ourselves succumbing to the pressure to deliver, above all, 
“skills“ and practical training. The here made contention is to introduce transnational case 
scenarios, constellations and case studies into the law school curriculum to illustrate the 
complexity of social and legal facts and the treacherousness of forgetting the former over 
an exclusive emphasis on the latter: using, for example, labor rights struggles as in the 
context of the Foxconn suicides or in the Bangladeshi ready-made-garment industry, we can 
introduce students to different layers of legal, political and social arguments in contexts 
where it is not enough to identify plaintiff and defendant. The “case“ beneath that case is 
infinitely more complex and necessitates historical, political, economic, cultural 
understanding. Confronting students in first and upper year classes with such instances of 
‘law in context‘, we might begin to complement our already ongoing efforts of making them 
sensitive to the ethical challenges of legal profession with accessible examples of 
transnational lawyering. Such illustrations bear crucial insights into the transnational 
complexities of rights advocacy, lawyering, access to justice and the legal process. 
Keywords: legal education, law school crisis, transnational lawyering, ethical lawyering, 
access to justice, transnational advocacy networks, legal process, law in context, 
transnational law, legal pluralism. 
Forthcoming in: Shauna Van Praagh and Helge Dedek (eds.), Stateless Law: Evolving 
Boundaries of a Discipline (Ashgate, 2014). 
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What lies Before, Behind and Beneath a Case? Five Minutes on 
Transnational Lawyering and the Consequences for Legal 
Education♣ 
PEER ZUMBANSEN* 
Caveat. 
I am, of course, borrowing title and ambition from Gustav Radbruch.1 The Social Democratic 
politician and legal philosopher was born in 1878 and served as Justice Minister during the 
early years of the Weimar Republic. He died in 1949. The “Five Minutes“ premedidate and 
capture the gist of his famous 1946 essay2, in which he observed that the Nazi judiciary had 
been rendered “defenceless“ by Legal Positivism. He went on to state that the discrepancy 
however between Nazi “law” and the law that would be built on “Zweckmäßigkeit” 
(expediency) and“Gerechtigkeit“ (justice) action had been so significant that the former 
could not have been “law at all”. In his 1945 sketch for the Newspaper, we find this idea 
expressed already in succinct form, delivered in five short paragraphs. The first paragraph 
minute states that both for soldiers and lawyers/judges the formula was that orders had to 
be obeyed, but in law it would be required of the judge to evaluate whether there is an 
unbearable discrepancy between what is the “law” and what “ought“ to tbe the law in light 
of considerations of expediency and justice. Minute 2 was devoted to the pronouncement 
that not all would count as “law” which serves the people, but only what “is“ law serves the 
people. In Minute 3 he stated that law had to strive for justice which meant that it must be 
committed to the respect for the individual and strive for equal protection for all. The next 
Minute, 4, is crucial as Radbruch here addresses the final element to accompany expediency 
and justice. That element – legal certainty – however, can of course be central to any 
authoritarian or non-authoritarian rule of law: in response to the concept’s attractive 
elusiveness and instrumentalizability,3 Radbruch formulates the phrase later famously 
endorsed in the Lawlessness essay: legal certainty has to back down where the gap between 
♣ This paper builds on the remarks offered at the STATELESS LAW conference at the Faculty of Law at McGill 
University on XX September 2012, celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Transsystemic Law Program. I am 
grateful to Dean Daniel Jutras as well as to Professors Lionel Smith, Shauna Van Praagh and Helge Dedek for 
the invitation to contribute to this memorable meeting and to Simon Archer, Helge Dedek, Priya Gupta, 
Alexandra Kemmerer and Hengameh Saberi for their valuable feedback. 
* Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. Email:
Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca  
1 “Fünf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie“, published on September 12, 1945 in the daily newspaper RHEIN-NECKAR-
ZEITUNG. 
2 “Gesetzliches Recht und übergesetzliches Unrecht”, (1946) Süddeutsche Juristenzeitung, 105-108 (“Statutory 
Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law” – St. Paulson transl., republished in (2006) 26:1 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies, 1-11.  
3 See A. Santos, 'The World Bank's Uses of the 'Rule of Law' Promise in Economic Development', in D. Trubek 
and A. Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 253-300. 
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the law and what we think law must be, becomes unbearably wide. In the fifth Minute, he 
provides us with the justificatory basis on which to evaluate and bridge the gap: referring to 
a core content of natural law, as it evolved over the course of centuries, Radbruch suggests 
that it is God’s law that will ultimately strike the balance. 
 
I am afraid, that my own five minutes for this epilogue at the end of an inspiring volume on 
the theme of “stateless law” and transsystemic legal education at the occasion of McGill’s 
Faculty of Law’s 10th anniversary celebration of its Transsystemic Law program are already 
over and all that was achieved was to invoke a seminal legal philosophical intervention. And, 
now that my five minutes are over before I could even begin to explain the connection 
between Radbruch and Transsystemia, please allow me another five minutes to justify this 
act of disobiedience. 
 
 
I. Transsystemia 
 
McGill’s program notably bridges the idiosyncracies and particularities of civil and common 
law by instructing students in a combination of principles and concepts borrowed from 
either legal culture. In that process, much more happens than merely another attempt to 
think about what keeps civil and common law apart or what connects both. Regardless of 
how committed the program instructors might or might not be on keeping the Civ-Com-Law 
comparison at the heart of their training, the enterprise inevitably exposes students to the 
much larger conceptual as well as real challenges arising from an engagement with law on 
the basis that it has multiple foundations as well as historical evolutionary trajectories – the 
bottom halves of the icebergs of the grand system and theory clashes in law, as McGill 
Patrick Glenn once called them.4 Because, once notions of context and evolution begin to 
enter the imagination, it becomes one thing to state that the transsystemic orientation is 
centered around civil and common law – it becomes quite another to keep it that way. As 
students learn about the origins, character traits and modes of development of each, they 
are becoming increasingly aware of how laws are products5 that can only be understood 
from within a particular context in which they are understood, accepted and employed as 
law or, as the case may be, rejected as other-than-law, non-law, unjust-law. Meanwhile, the 
words, terms and categories are but attempts to give expression to the different meanings 
of law, a process that must always remain tentative, experimentalist.6 
 
                                                        
4 H. P. Glenn, 'Doin' the Transsystemic: Legal Systems and Legal Traditions', (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 863-
898, 867. 
5 M. Villey, Leçons d’histoire de la philosophie du droit, rev. éd. (Paris: Dalloz, 1962, 202, cited in Glenn, above 
note 4, 870: “...le juriste défend une cause. Décrire pour lui c‘est choisir.“ 
6 D. Jutras, 'Énoncer l'indicible: le droit entre langue et traditions', (2000) 52 Revue internationale de droit 
comparé 781-796, 795: “…on peut […] dire que les réprésentations propres à chaque tradition constituent 
autant de tentatives d’exprimer une normativité souterraine et indicible, une normativité implicite, sinon 
immanente aux rapports sociaux, qui déborde les cultures juridiques nationales.” 
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As this engagement with law’s mind and matter informs the design and implementation of 
the law school’s ambitious legal education program, a crucial insight the students can gain 
already at the beginning of their training in how to both understand and navigate the 
boundaries between civil and common law, is that there is more of what the two legal 
cultures have in common than what separates them. From that perspective, the boundaries 
between the two cultures begin to appear in a different light. They now are becoming 
explainable against particular historical data, concrete contexts and  instances as well as 
institutional and political roads taken. At the same time, students begin to appreciate how 
the distinction between civil and common law to the degree that it aims to capture enduring 
differences in character and nature are perhaps more a matter of convention and discursive 
practice than actually grounded in the ongoing practice of either. Namely, common law’s 
core feature, that is the commitment to and the central role played by adjudication, can 
relatively easily be found all across so-called civil law systems. We could add further 
elements to illustrate the ultimate elusiveness of the purported boundaries between the 
two legal cultures, but that is not even necessary. More important for our present purposes 
is to take one step back and look at the context in which this discussion is taking place 
today. It is this context I am most interested in when I reflect on the immense merits and 
promises of a program such as McGill’s.  
 
A few keywords stand out which appear to sketch the contours as well some of the 
structural features of this context. The increasing proliferation of non-state actors involved 
in the preparation and  collaboration in or even the solely responsible production of norms 
has been a central feature of the modern Western welfare state throughout the course of 
the late Twentieth Century.7 This devolution of norm creation from the state to a wide range 
of societal actors has prompted everything from doomsday pronouncements regarding the 
decline of public authority to Carl Schmitt’s lament over the Levaithan being cut up and 
devoured by society8 to triumphant claims that the welfare state was an erroneous path,9 
from which only the embrace of societal self-regulation, “social norms” and a rejection of an 
interventionist state.10 Somewhere in between this conceptual and real, institutional and 
procedural turf war, ideas of adapting law to these changing circumstances: in the names of 
                                                        
7 C. Scott, 'Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance', (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 56-76; B. Morgan/K. Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation. Texts and 
Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
8 C. Schmitt, 'State Ethics and the Pluralist State (orig. published in German as 'Staatsethik und pluralistischer 
Staat', in Schmitt, Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar - Genf - Versailles 1923-1939, Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot 1988 [1940], 133-145)', in A. J. Jacobson and B. Schlink (eds), Weimar. A Jurisprudence of Crisis 
(University of California Press, 1930), 300-312. 
9 F. A. Hayek, The Mirage of Social Justice [Law, Legislation and Liberty. A new statement of the liberal principles 
of justice and political economy, vol. 2] (The University of Chicago Press, 1976). This claim just repeats itself: see, 
e.g., C. Hoffmann/P. Bessard, Sackgasse Sozialstaat. Alternativen zu einem Irrweg (Liberales Institut, 2011). 
10 See the critical takes by two who know: R. C. Ellickson, 'Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms', (1998) 
27 Journal of Legal Studies 537-565, and S. Macaulay, 'Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of Custom? 
Thoughts about the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein', (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 
775-804. 
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responsive11 and reflexive,12 even learning13 law, scholars sought to capture the essence of 
law as an instrument of people’s egalitarian self-government in a context in which the 
welfare state’s capacity to develop and deliver social safeguards had started to become 
precarious, both financially and conceptually. This “exhaustion” of the Welfare State, as 
Jürgen Habermas called it,14 resulted in a normative and institutional ambiguity that indeed 
encapsulates much of the structure we are confronted with in our present-day transnational 
constellation.15 The “legal pluralism” of global legal cultures is referred to in empirical-
sociological16 as well as normative-philosophical17 ways. The diffusion of norm creation 
processes through “hard” forms such as treaties and laws to more “soft” forms including 
conventions, codes, guidelines to even more elusive, possibly out-of-legal-bounds norms 
such as recommendations, suggestions, public relations statements illustrates the richness 
of a regulatory wonderland, but the politics of it all remain, well, all over the place. Who 
counts as competent actor in this hybrid, pluralistic norm-creation universe? The individual 
or organization with the expertise, competence and most adequate understanding of the 
problem at hand? Or, he, she who is authorized to deliver (and, enforce) binding norms of 
law? The transnational regulatory landscape is above all characterized by an intriguing, if 
often bewildering side-by-side and interaction among Actors, Norms and Processes.18 What 
are we to make of these terms? Do they constitute ‘new’ categories of ‘old’, Western 
Welfare State institutional-conceptual frameworks such as the Rule of Law, Separation of 
Powers, normative hierarchy and unity of law, or are they bloodless word-phrases, loosely 
attached to the madness of gl0bal un-law with a piece of gum? 
 
II. Reality Bites 
 
We are not making any of this up. Read Jack Goldsmith’s poignant reminder of what is at 
stake when, in what could have been the eve of a U.S.-led attack on Syria, the legally entirely 
ambiguous “precedent” of the Nato bombing of Serbia 1999 is used to justify the 
“enforcement” of “international norms” through unilateral military action.19 How much 
                                                        
11 G. Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law', (1983) 17 Law & Society Review 239-285. 
12 P. Nonet/P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition. Toward Responsive Law (Octagon Books, 1978). 
13 C. F. Sabel/J. Zeitlin, 'Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
EU', (2008) 14 European Law Journal 271-327; P. Zumbansen, 'Law's Effectiveness and Law's Knowledge: 
Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal Theory', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 417-438. 
14 J. Habermas, 'The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies 
[1985]', in J. Habermas (ed) The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate [ed. and transl. 
by Shierry Weber Nicholsen] (MIT Press, 1989), 48-70. 
15 See, e.g., K. W. Abbott/D. Snidal, 'Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New 
Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit', (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 501-578. 
16 R. A. MacDonald/J. MacLean, 'No Toilets in Park', (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal 721-787; B. d. Sousa Santos, 
'Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law', (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 279-
302. 
17 N. Kasirer, 'Lex-icographie mercatoria', (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 653-676;  
18 P. Zumbansen, 'Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private 
Power', (2013) 76 Law & Contemporary Problems http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252208 
19 J.Goldsmith, What Happened to the Rule of Law?, NEW YORK TIMES, 31 August 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/31/opinion/what-happened-to-the-rule-of-law.html?hp&_r=1&  
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would our public international law students learn if we engaged them in this turmoil over 
what is and what isn’t, what should and what shouldn’t be a precedent?20 
 
Maybe, then, all we can do is to learn as we go along. Just as JM Keynes both recognized 
and cautioned against the human tendency to read yesterday’s numbers to predict their 
magnitude today,21 we often hopelessly use legal history and doctrine to write lines in the 
sand.22 Instead, what we want to do, and what Radbruch intentioned, is making 
connections, for example between present experiences of crisis and loss of bearings and the 
past and present of human conventions, of instances of consensus and pronouncement, 
that themselves grew out of hard-fought-for-and-over processes of deliberation.23 We have 
long learned that the legitimacy of such processes not only depends on Radbruch’s and our 
capacity to hear Him but to question the boundaries and scope of the “we”.24 In other 
words, questions of belonging, membership, integration are central to the reflection on a 
legal system the institutional foundations have become so diffused.25 Connected to these 
must be the awareness of the ongoing and effective processes of exclusion, demarcation 
and devaluation.26 One’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Precedent, in law, is caught 
up in legal narrative. That narrative, the reconstruction of meaning along what becomes a 
“line of cases”, is always embedded, as the Kosovo-as-precedent example illustrates, in an 
infinite number of alternative narratives. We are only too aware of this in any instance of 
legal interpretation27 as well as in our identification of normativity.28 The true challenge for 
lawyers is the conscious navigation of the space between the case that’s before the court 
and the “cases” behind, underneath that case. 
 
Looking at this, we open our curriculum catalogues and course programs and wonder. What 
is it that we are doing? What should lawyers study today? Why are we both constantly 
                                                        
20 The background can easily be discerned here: M. Koskenniemi, ''The Lady Doth Protest Too Much'. Kosovo, 
and the Turn to Ethics in International Law', (2002) 65 Modern Law Review 159-175, A. Orford, 'Muscular 
Humanitarianism: Reading the Narratives of the New Interventionism', (2003) 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 679-711, and A. L. 
Paulus, 'The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?', (2004) 25 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 691. For an insightful engagement with precedent, see F. Schauer, ‘Precedent‘, in: 
A. Marmor (ed.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Law (Routledge: New York, 2012), available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1836384.  
21 JM Keynes, General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (Harcourt, Brace & Co.: New York, 1936), ch. 12. 
22 R. J. Shiller, Irrational Exuberance, 2nd ed. (Currency Doubleday, 2005) ; G. A. Akerlof/R. J. Shiller, Animal 
Spirits. How Human Psychology Drives the Economy, and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism (Princeton 
University Press, 2009). 
23 P. Pierson, Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
24 B. d. Sousa Santos, 'Beyond Abyssal Thinking. From global lines to ecologies of knowledge', (2007) Eurozine 
http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-06-29-santos-en.html. 
25 S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
26 R. MacDonald, 'Whose Access? Which Justice?', (1992) 7 Canadian Journal of Law & Society 175. 
27 R. M. Cover, 'Nomos and Narrative', (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4-68. 
28 S. F. Moore, 'Law and Social Change: the semi-autonomous field as an appropriate subject of study', (1973) 7 
Law & Society Review 719-746; D. R. Holmes/G. E. Marcus, 'Cultures of Expertise and the Management of 
Globalization: Toward the Refunctioning of Ethnography', in A. Ong and S. J. Collier (eds), Global Assemblages: 
Technology, Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems (Blackwell, 2005), 235-252. 
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disturbed and intrigued by calls for introducing more Business School-like “case studies” in 
legal education?29 Maybe, our skepticism has its roots in a stubborn insistence on law’s 
embeddedness in a long history that is, above all, a trove of discursive and political struggles 
over the very meaning of the words which are traded on today’s market of attention. The 
awareness of this history and background leads to Hercules‘ humility and aspiration to “get 
it right“.30 Meanwhile, why not “teach“ Goldsmith’s op-ed31 rather than Simma’s and 
Cassese’s stand-off in European Journal of International Law in 1999?32 How to combine the 
accessibility, sharpness and in-the-midst-of-it-all nature of the op-ed with the formidably rich 
yet succinct restatements of legality as the ultimate boundary on the one hand (Simma) and 
legitimacy as the necessary herald of a new legality (Cassese)? 
 
 
III. The “Cases” behind, underneath and before the Case 
 
Verba docent, exempla trahunt. Rather than teaching law from Abraham, Raskalnikov or HLA 
Hart, why not read the news? Why not confront students with the reality and complexity of 
the ‘cases‘ unfolding right before our eyes? Why not try to facilitate students to discern the 
‘legal aspects‘ of stories reported by the media, stories that centrally implicate competing 
visions of justice, human rights and social order? 
 
September 2007: The Canadian Federal government begins to implement the “Indian 
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement“. 33The IRSSA had been concluded the previous 
year following an inherently troubled alternative dispute resolution process, eventually 
launched, after earlier attempts, in 2003. Beyond establishing a system to determine 
eligibility and to distribute pro-rated, financial compensations to former students of the 
Canadian Indian Residential Schools system, the Settlement further resulted in the 
institutionalization of the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Launched in 2008, it is expected that the TRC will conclude its work in 2014. The Canadian 
Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, publicly issued an Apology34 on the part of the Canadian 
state for the role that the government had played in the establishment and administration 
of the residential schools. What is the significance of the settlement, the approval, the 
apology, the commission?35 
                                                        
29 http://www.law.harvard.edu/academics/degrees/jd/pos/law-and-bus/ (Accessed 21 November 2013) 
30 R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). 
31 Above, note 19. 
32 B. Simma, 'NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects', (1999) 10 European Journal of International 
Law 1-22; A. Cassese, 'Ex inuiria ius oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of Forcible 
Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World  Community?', (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 23-
30. 
33 http://www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/english.html (accessed 21 November 2013). The caption on the 
homepage reads “The residential schools settlement has been approved. The healing continues.” 
34 Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, Statement of Apology – to former students of Indian Residential Schools, 11 June 
2008, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1100100015649 (accessed 21 November 2013). 
35 M. Laing, ‘An Analysis of Canada’s Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (2013) 4:1 
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review 34; D.B. MacDonald & G. Hudson, ‘The Genocide Question and Indian 
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November 2011: The German Federal Administrative Court upholds a ban on muslim prayers 
performed in a public (Berlin) high school during break-hours with reference to the need to 
protect peace and order in the school.36 A group of muslim adolescents had, in a relatively 
removed part of the school, performed muslim ritual prayers, a practice that the school 
board had declared impermissible. After the first instance court had struck down this ban,37 
the respondents eventually saw the highest administrative court side with the school’s 
administration. Arguing that the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, as protected 
under the German Grundgesetz (constitution) found their limits in the right of the state to 
maintain a secular, non-discriminatory space of public education, the Court sparked a wide-
ranging debate over the exercise of religious rights in public spaces.38 
 
May 2012: A German district court recognizes criminal battery in the case of a medical 
practitioner who, two years prior, had performed a male circumcision on a 4-year old muslim 
with parental consent.39 An outcry across a range of religious as well as secular 
organizations, interest groups and activists follows this decision. Ten months later, the 
German federal government passes a law explicitly legalizing male circumcision.40 Polls 
show that 70% of the public disagrees with this legislation. 
 
February 2013: Following a wave of protests, riots, unofficial strikes as well as numerous 
worker suicides among the 1,2 million employees of the Taiwan based Apple products 
manufacturing company Foxconn in China, Apple announces that it will allow the periodical 
election of union representatives for Foxconn employees. Despite a broad concern with 
worker conditions at the factories of this global brand company, the unionization news are 
met with considerable skepticism.41 Critique is levelled against the questionable election 
processes and the asymmetric power distribution between management and employees 
within the union. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Residential Schools in Canada’ (2012) 45:2 Canadian Journal of Political Science 427; see already J. Llewellyn, 
‘Dealing with the Legacy of Native Residential School Abuse in Canada: Litigation, ADR, and Restorative 
Justice’ (2002) 52 University of Toronto Law Journal 253. 
36 German Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht), Decision of 30 November 2011 [BVerwG 6 
C 20.10]; see the commentary by H.Rubin, ‘Das islamische Gebet in der Schule – Bespr. von BVerwG v. 
30.11.2011, (2012) JURA, 718-722. 
37 Administrative Court Berlin (Verwaltungsgericht), Decision of 29 September 2009 [3 A 394.07]. 
38 See, e.g., http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/11/30/180140.html (accessed 21 November 2013). 
39 Regional Court (Landgericht) Cologne, Judgement of 7 May 2012 [151 Ns 169/11], published in: (2012) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift), 2128; see, hereto, the essay by Bijan Fateh-Moghadam, ‘Criminalizing male 
circumcision? Case Note: Landgericht Cologne, Judgment of 7 May 2012 – No. 151 Ns 169/11’, (2012) 13:9 German 
Law Journal, 1131-1145. 
40 http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2012/42042381_kw50_de_beschneidung/ (accessed 
21 November 2013). 
41 http://www.mirova.com/Content/Documents/Mirova/publications/va/focus/MIROVA_FOCUS_ 
Foxconn%20labour%20union%20elections.pdf (accessed 21 November 2013) 
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April 2013: The U.S. Supreme Court rules in the case brought by a group of Nigerian human 
rights groups and activists that the 1789 Alien Tort Statute does not provide a substantive 
claim in cases of alleged human rights violations by multinationals in foreign jurisdictions. 
The Kiobel decision42 follows on a string of related cases all concerned with the justiciability 
of egregious rights violations by corporations, often colluding with paramilitaries or other 
host country officials towards company employees and other segments of the local 
population.43 The decision is received with great disappointment, as the ATS had become a 
promising, if always ambiguous vehicle not only to litigate such cases, but also to bring the 
underlying facts to a wider, Western public attention.44  
 
June 2013: the U.S. Supreme Court delivers two much anticipated same sex marriage 
decisions. For many years already, this issue has been on the minds of lawmakers, activists 
and the general public in many countries around the world. Especially the Court’s much 
anticipated decision in United States v. Windsor45 is, despite competing – including, 
transnational46 – interpretations of the judgment’s consequences, generally seen as a 
significant step in the evolution of the law in this area. Domestically, the public policy debate 
surrounding and following the Supreme Court’s verdict goes private: In the midst of this 
ongoing conversation about “horizontal effect”, governmental “intervention“ and 
corporate social responsibility, Wal-Mart, with 1,2m U.S. employees the country’s biggest 
private sector employer, announces that it will with immediate effect extend the company’s 
health care benefits to same-sex partners of members of its workforce.47 Directly following 
this news, labor side as well as LGBT representatives lament that in reality a large number of 
Wal-Mart employees cannot afford to contract into the company’s health care plan in the 
first place.48 
 
                                                        
42 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 185 L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013). 
43 O. Murray/D. Kinley/C. Pitts, 'Exaggerated Rumours of a Death of an Alien Tort? Corporations, Human Rights, 
and the Remarkable Case of Kiobel', (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 57-94;  
44 Center for Justice and Accountability: Kiobel v. Shell – Light Dims on Human Rights Claims in the U.S., 
http://cja.org/section.php?id=510 (accessed 21 November 2013); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, ‘The Irony of the 
Surpeme Court’s Decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum’, (2013) laborprof_blog, 18 April 2013, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2013/04/the-irony-of-the-supreme-courts-decision-in-kiobel-
v-royal-dutch-petroleum.html (accessed 21 November 2013). 
45 570 U.S.___ (2013): http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-307_6j37.pdf (accessed 21 November 
2013). 
46 http://polityinindia.wordpress.com/2013/07/09/acaseforsamesexmarriages/; see also Reecha Daz, 
‘Constitutional Principles in US v Windsor in the Indian Context’, Centre for Law & Policy Research, 23 July 2013, 
http://clpr.org.in/windsor/ (accessed 21 November 2013), discussing the significance of the US Supreme Court’s 
ruling in the Indian context after the 2009 Delhi High Court judgment in the Naz Foundation case, which 
legalized homosexuality. 
47 http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/29/walmart-s-new-embrace-of-gay-employees-a-sign-of-
corporate-shift.html (accessed 21 November 2013). 
48 http://www.dailyfinance.com/on/walmart-offer-benefits-same-sex-partners-leaked-memo/ (accessed 
21 November 2013). 
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Question: Should law students learn how to address cases such as those anecdotally 
rendered here? If the answer were “yes”, the following question would be how to teach 
students the “law” of these “cases”.  
 
Assumption: Sometimes, as with Foxconn or, even more recently, the long-brooding struggle 
over labor and human rights for the Bangladeshi ready-made-garment industry,49 some of 
these cases are not “cases” yet and hence there is no perhaps no easy way to include them in 
the curriculum. ‘Skill training’, clinical legal education50, ‘experiential learning’51 – all these 
are but the tips of an iceberg, representing deeper disputes over the aims of legal education, 
the roles of lawyers in a changing, transnationalizing52 society and a precarisation of 
employment and long-term security.53 The task of reforming legal education, thus regarded, 
becomes an exercise in reflection upon the nature of legal knowledge54 and the scope of 
ethical and political responsibility of lawyers.55 
 
Association: Take the example of the Canadian Residential Schools Settlement. What is the 
legal “field” the different dimensions of this ‘case’ would best be addressed in? To make this 
line of inquiry even more poignant: which course at a law school would likely include a 
session on the Settlement for its students? Is the IRSSA a (Canadian) example of an 
increasingly transnational concern with so-called Transitional Justice?56 If so, what are the 
lessons of the IRSSA for law students? How and in which course should they learn about the 
procedural intricacies, the access to justice challenges and the law and reconciliation 
                                                        
49 See, e.g., Edward Bearnot, ‘Bangladesh: A Labor Paradox’, The World Policy Institute, 2 May 2013 “Join the 
Conversation”, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/fall2013/Bangladesh-Labor-Paradox (accessed 21 November 
2013). 
50 Nadia Chiesa, ‘The Five Lessons I learned Through Clinical Legal Education’, (2009) 10:7 German Law Journal, 
1113-1124, online at: http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_1113-1126_Chiesa.pdf; 
Richard Wilson, ‘Western Europe: Last Holdout in the Worldwide Acceptance of Clinical Legal Education’, 
(2009) 10:7 German Law  Journal, 823-846, online at: 
http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_823-846_Wilson.pdf.  
51 L. Sossin, 'Experience the Future of Legal Education', (2013) CLPE OHLS Research Paper No. 47/2013 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2337521. 
52 H. Dedek/A. de Mestral, ''Born to be Wild': The 'Trans-systemic' Programme at McGill and the De-
Nationalization of Legal Education', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 889-911; R. Jukier, 'Challenging the Existing 
Paradigm: How to Transnationalize the Legal Curriculum', (2006) 24 Penn State International Law Review 775-
786; P. B. Bevans/J. S. McKay, 'The Association of Transnational Law Schools' Agora: An Experiment in 
Graduate Legal Pedagogy', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 929-958 
[http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_929-958_Bevans_McKay.pdf] 
53 G. Standing, The Precariat. The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury, 2011); see, in this vein, R. Sennett, The 
Culture of the New Capitalism (Yale University Press, 2006). 
54 P. Zumbansen, 'Law's Effectiveness and Law's Knowledge: Reflections from Legal Sociology and Legal 
Theory', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 417-438; M. Thornton, 'The Law School, the Market, and the New 
Knowledge Economy', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 641-668 
[http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_641-668_Thornton.pdf]. 
55 H. W. Arthurs, 'Law and Learning in an Era of Globalization', (2009) 10 German Law Journal 629-640 
[http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_629-640_Arthurs.pdf] 
56 See, e.g., the contributions to R Buchanan & P Zumbansen (eds.), Law in Transition: Rights, Development and 
Transitional Justice [with an epilogue by Bryant Garth] (Oxford/Portland: Hart, 2014 – in print). 
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dimensions that are at the heart of the Settlement?57 What will happen is that this 
“problem” (not case) will perhaps, if at all, be addressed in a new, small seminar on 
“Transitional Justice”. Alternatively, we could imagine it playing a role in courses on “Legal 
Professionalism”, or “Legal Foundations”, “Legal Sociology”, or, perhaps, “Legal History”. 
In the context of such courses, presumably taught at the start of the increasingly 
condensed58 and simultaneously overburdened legal program, the Settlement will at the 
least function as an element of providing some historical context for those students aware 
of these events as well as with an interest in “Aboriginal law“, or “Transitional Justice“ At 
best, the Settlement could serve as an illustration of the many complex layers of a problem 
as they become visible when lawyers attempt to find a legal solution to a deeply ingrained 
and only very incompletely “worked through” historical experience.59  
 
Utopia: Students enrolled in a class on Mediation and ADR would be confronted with a fast 
growing range of non-commercial, non-corporate legal conflicts that prompt alternative 
dispute resolution techniques and competences.60 Offering an array, say, of fields such as 
labour61, family62 or commercial law 63 disputes along with an example such as the IRSSA 
could then be used to introduce students to the paradoxical relation between the limits of 
the law in trying to adequately grasp and address all the dimensions of the IRSSA as they 
become evident around the TRC proceedings64 and wide-ranging public debates on the one 
hand and the potential for law to push these boundaries and limits in order to make law 
more receptive and responsive to these overwhelming dimensions on the other.65  
 
And, then? In other words, how can this last mentioned utopia be put in relation to the 
reality of a continuous reluctance of students to engage with law in such unbounded 
manner, considering an ever greater pressure from the market to leave law school with 
                                                        
57 R. L. Nagy, 'The Scope and Bounds of Transitional Justice and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission', (2012) 6 International Journal of Transitional Justice 1-22. 
58 http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/08/26/president-obama-calls-cutting-year-law-school (accessed 21 
November 2013). 
59 R. W. Gordon, 'Undoing Historical Injustice', in A. Sarat and T. R. Kearns (eds), Justice and Injustice in Law and 
Legal Theory (University of Michigan Press, 1999), 35-77; R. M. Buxbaum, 'From Paris to London: The Legal 
History of European Reparation Claims 1946-1953', (2012) UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 1914802 
http://works.bepress.com/richard_buxbaum/1/. 
60 M. Alberstein, 'ADR and Transitional Justice as Reconstructing the Rule of Law', (2011) Journal of Dispute 
Resolution http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/7/ 
61 A. Chagma, 'Alternative Dispute Resolution under Labor Law in Bangladesh', (2012) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2096949 . 
62 R. H. Mnookin/L. Kornhauser, 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce', (1979) 88 Yale Law 
Journal 950-997; A. J. Cohen, 'The Family, the Market, and ADR', (2011) Journal of Dispute Resolution 91-126. 
63 Y. Dezalay/B. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order (Chicago University Press, 1996)  
64 M. James, 'A Carnival of Truth? Ignorance and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission', (2012) 6 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 182. 
65 H. Genn, 'Why the Privatisation of Civil Justice is a Rule of Law Issue', (2012) 36th F.A. Mann Lecture, Lincoln's 
Inn, 19 November 2012 1-21 
(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/docs/Hazel/36th%20F%20A%20Mann%20Lecture%20Website.pdf). 
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skills, practical competence and an advanced understanding of numerous, highly specialized 
fields?66 
 
IV. The Lawyer: Trained How, Serving Whom? 
 
Dire job prospects, rising student debt, insufficiently trained graduates for legal practice? 
What should be the goal of reform in light of these contentions? Legal education reform has 
long been on the minds of Law School deans, bar associations and judges, while students 
everywhere are joining the debates as both victims and consumers.67 Meanwhile, the logics 
of the market appear to drive the debate, as the trade-offs between a two- or three-year JD 
program are weighed against the background of skyrocketed fees and decreased salary 
expectations.68 What is the nature of the problem we are facing? What, in other words, can 
explain the disconnect between the increased frustration with a market-driven legal 
education system on the one hand and the growing excitement about law’s 
interdisciplinarity and lawyers’ engagement with historians, ethnographers and activists, on 
the other? If the latter suggests the need to take a closer look at the complexity of law and 
its explanatory value in a transnationalizing society, how can this be made compatible with a 
debate around two or three years of legal education? The key to the answer might be found 
by bringing the aspects of legal theory and legal practice closer together. 
 
In this vein, let us return to some of the other examples offered in the beginning. By now, 
the here suggested steps of inquiry through the sequence of 1. question, 2. assumption, 
3. association, and,  4. utopia is familiar enough to allow us to see that the distance between 
the first three steps and the latter is indeed much smaller than thought at first. We can 
already recognize that the established ways of not associating the mentioned non-cases 
with a particular, neatly circumscribed legal ‘field’ are intimately tied to a denial of utopia. In 
other words, it is not that the utopian lawyer pushes against the citadel of a self-assured, 
parochial doctrinal framework in the name of the yet impossible, unthinkable, out-of-the-
                                                        
66 Lincoln Caplan, ‘An Existential Crisis for Law Schools‘, New York Times, July 14, 2012, available online at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/opinion/sunday/an-existential-crisis-for-law-schools.html?_r=0; Paul M. 
Barrett, ‘The Case Against Law School‘, Bloomberg Business Week, April 1, 2013, available online at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-04-01/the-case-against-law-school; Eric Posner, ‘The Real Problem 
With Law Schools. They train too many Lawyers‘, SLATE, April 2, 2013, available online at: 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/04/the_real_problem_with_law_sc
hools_too_many_lawyers.html.  
67 See the comprehensive data in the LSSE’s 2012 Law School Survey of Student Engagement Report: “Lessons 
from Law Students on Legal Education“, available online at: 
http://www.lssse.iub.edu/pdf/2012/LSSSE_2012_AnnualReport.pdf (with an intriguing foreword by UC Irvine’s 
Dean, Erwin Chemerinsky, ‘The Benefits of Knowledge‘, id., at 4 – highligthing the crucial role played by 
experiential learning as part of law students‘ education). In this vein, see Sossin, above, note 51. See also L. F. P. 
Hurtado, 'Transnationalizing Mexican Legal Education: But, What About Students’ Expectations?', (2009) 10 
German Law Journal 767-782 [http://germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol10No07/PDF_Vol_10_No_07_SI_767-
782_Hurtado.pdf]. 
68 Daniel B. Rodriguez & Samuel Estreicher, ‘Make Law Schools Earn a Third Year‘, New York Times, January 17, 
2013, available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/opinion/practicing-law-should-not-mean-living-in-
bankruptcy.html?_r=1&.  
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worldish legal imagination. Rather, it is that the line drawing, which is done through the 
identification of what belongs to a legal ‘field’ and what falls through the cracks of all legal 
(doctrinal) fields, denies any such utopia from the start by establishing an entire universe of 
self-sufficient legal reproduction.69 Even if we can well remember how environmental law 
had to break through the shells of tort law in order to develop legal concepts and 
instruments that would be adequate to the emerging risk-society, we still tend to treat both 
‘tort law’ and ‘environmental law’ as legal fields that correspond to a number of courses in 
any school’s curriculum and which, more importantly, capture the ways in which law deals 
with a particular segment of societal activity and conflict. What fades into the background is 
the struggle over the stakes of law’s engagement with a reality that is never just ‘found’, but 
always constructed. Because tort law has a relatively long history in both legal practice and 
education, it is not often presented to students as the subject of conceptual, let alone 
political reform. Of course, we all know that “tort law reform” touches on sensitive areas of 
market organization and power asymmetries in advanced post-industrial societies70, but 
how effective are we really to involve students in the classroom in an engaged reflection on 
these changing contours of a legal field, which they learn through a cascade of condensed 
cases and interspersed case-book presentations of “Notes and Questions”? Do we do 
enough to train our students to feel comfortable in their roles as stakeholders in a 
continuing debate over the aims and outcomes of legal fields? How can we train them even 
better to understand tort law ‘in context’, which means today to include a more than 
superficial introduction to the changing dimensions of post-industrial, globally integrated 
markets, the proliferation of expert standard making and the correlating pressure on public 
oversight, in short: to the realities of globalized market organization today? It would be 
against this background that students would come to appreciate the stakes involved in 
imagining, creating and developing a new field – for example, environmental law. While 
similar contentions can be made for the development of, say, internet law or, more recently, 
“transitional justice”71, the question remains how best to give students even a hint of such 
challenges during their legal classroom education. How, indeed, could we train students to 
understand and to assume their roles as ‘game changers’, as agents of change and critical 
reflection, when it comes to break down barriers between neatly contained ‘fields’ of reality 
control72 as well as between such legal fields and different disciplinary demarcations of 
meaning? 
 
Question: Returning to the example of the tension between the American Supreme Court’s 
struggle with same sex marriage (as well as with federalism, equal protection and standing 
                                                        
69 See, e.g., P. Zumbansen, 'The Politics of Relevance: Law, Translation and Alternative Knowledges', (2013) 
CLPE OHLS Research Paper No. 45/2013 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2340691. 
70 M. F. Grace/J. T. Leverty, 'How Tort Reform Affects Insurance Markets', (2012) Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/07/24/jleo.ews026.abstract; see already: P. M. 
Danzon, 'Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets', (1984) 13 Journal of Legal 
Studies 517-549. 
71 See R. Nagy, above note 57. 
72 See the inspiring comments by R. Mani, 'Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus 
between Transitional Justice and Development', (2008) 2 International Journal of Transitional Justice 253-265. 
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of non-state parties to argue the constitutionality of a public statute) and Walmart, a 
company of Leviathanist dimensions that chooses to create a self-binding norm, we are 
prompted to ask how the law is to treat this c0nstellation. On its face, the question seems to 
be about the nature of this self-binding commitment on the part of the company. We ask 
whether what Walmart does, should be considered as ‘law’ or, at least, as something 
comparable to a legal norm. Much seems to speak against it, but perhaps not everything. 
The fact that Walmart is not a democratically elected body with the authority to create law 
points to the company’s declaration of having no legal significance – at least from a public 
law perspective. But, what becomes of the allegedly ‘private‘ nature of Walmart, if we take 
into consideration its far-reaching impact on the employment, financial security, health and 
welfare of millions of its workers? Echoing longstanding debates73 around the foundations 
and scope of ‘corporate social responsibility‘74, Adolf Berle in 1954 already masterfully 
deconstructed the mythology of corporations‘ private nature.75 More recently, scholars have 
continued the investigation into the grey areas between public and private regulation, 
finding that much of CSR occurs through an interaction between state and market actors.76 
Recent years have seen the increasing proliferation of private and hybrid – public-private – 
norm generation in areas reaching from environmental self-regulation77, accounting78 and 
commercial rule making79 to labour law80 and corporate governance.81 Against this 
background, what really tells us that Wal-Mart cannot be a “law maker” of sorts? If that 
were indeed the case, we would possibly have to regard the company’s declaration of 
extending health benefit to same sex partners of its employees as a ‘health care measure’. 
What are the stakes of such a development? The answer seems to depend on the 
perspective: emphasizing the ‘adaption’ of a private actor to changes in the law – here in the 
form of a Supreme Court ruling that does not directly bind the company – would lead us to 
welcome this act as one of unmandated compliance. Focusing, however, on the legitimacy 
                                                        
73 L. D. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness (Viking, 1934); B. S. Prunty, 'Love and the Business Corporation', (1960) 46 
Virginia Law Review 467-476. 
74 For insightful treatments of the history, see, e.g., A. Crane/D. Matten/J. Moon, Corporations and Citizenship 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008), and J. G. Ruggie, Just Business. Multinational Corporations and Human 
Rights (Norton, 2013). 
75 A. A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1954), in particular the chapter 
on “The City of God”. 
76 D. Vogel, 'The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct', in W. Mattli and N. Woods (eds), The Politics 
of Global Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 151-188; B. Sheehy, 'Understanding CSR: An Empirical 
Study of Private Self-Regulation', (2012) 38 Monash Law Review http://works.bepress.com/benedict_sheehy/15/. 
77 Sheehy, previous note; E. Meidinger, 'The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: the Case of 
Forestry', (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 47-87. 
78 D. Kerwer, 'Rules that Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation', (2005) 18 Governance: An International 
Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 611-632. 
79 G.-P. Calliess, 'Lex Mercatoria: A Reflexive Law Guide To An Autonomous Legal System', in: 2 German Law 
Journal 17 (1 November 2001) available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=109. 
80 H. W. Arthurs, 'Labor Law Without the State', (1996) 46 University of Toronto Law Journal 1-45; K. Kolben, 
'Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance', (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 403-437. 
81 P. Zumbansen, 'Neither `Public' nor `Private', `National' nor `International': Transnational Corporate 
Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective', (2011) 38 Journal of Law & Society 50-75. 
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grounds of Walmart’s action, we have to remain skeptical about the precarious state of 
those receiving and the power stance of those who are giving – a grave asymmetry at best.82 
 
What a frustrating insight after the initial excitement over a corporate giant that cared to 
put in place rules which could potentially benefit its employees – and certain of the 
company’s stakeholders, without being legally obligated to do so. The contextualization of 
such an act, however, revealed that we have to consider the bigger picture of companies 
that engage in comparable CSR initiatives without at the same time becoming accountable 
under compliance regimes enforceable by the state. While here, too, much is changing83, the 
trick is to not only acknowledge the fuzzyness of the boundaries separating state and 
market but, moreover, to complement such conceptual considerations with sustained 
empirical research and data gathering.84 The task, altogether, is to unfold this ‘bigger 
picture’ as well as its consequences in the classroom and underscore the conceptual and 
educational synergies that characterize a well-designed curriculum – one that is based on a 
thorough engagement with the changes in legal theory and legal practice and the 
awareness of the crucial role to be played by experiential learning in the context of cutting-
edge theory training. 
 
V. Tracing, Placing Our Footsteps: Cautiously, Boldly 
 
Assumption: Let us take a few steps back in order to catch our breath, hopefully to become 
able to gain some historical perspective on the way in which lawyers have been addressing 
the space between case and “cases” as well as the boundaries between purportedly distinct 
legal “fields”. How far back should we look? Starting in the 1950s, we see a fascinating 
acceleration of events and concepts. While the European and American post-World War II 
reconstruction was at first able to cover up, however partially, the deep-running societal 
conflicts that had plagued rapidly the fast industrializing, militarizing and commercializing 
                                                        
82 In this vein: H. W. Arthurs, 'Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation', in J. Conaghan, R. M. Fischl and K. Klare (eds), Labour Law 
in an Era of Globalization. Transformative Practices and Possibilities (Oxford University Press, 2002), 471-487, and 
A. Blackett, 'Global Governance, Legal Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of 
Corporate Conduct', (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 401-447. 
83 See, e.g., D. Scheffer/C. Kaeb, 'The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate Liability under 
the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in Compliance Theory', (2011) 29 Berkeley 
Journal of International Law 311-397. See also the European Parliament [EP] Report on ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility: Accountable, Transparent and Responsible Business Behaviour and Sustainable Growth’ of 
28 January 2013, available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-0017+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN.  
84 Sheehy, above note 76; this is emphasized as well by K. W. Abbott/D. Snidal, 'Strengthening International 
Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit', (2009) 42 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 501-578, K. W. Abbott, 'Engaging the public and the private in global 
sustainability governance', (2012) 88 International Affairs 543-564 and by C. Scott, 'Reflexive governance, meta-
regulation and corporate social responsibility: the 'Heineken effect'', in N. Boeger, R. Murray and C. Villiers 
(eds), Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (Edward Elgar, 2008), 170-185. 
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Western societies since the late 18th century,85 the dream of ‘the affluent society’ was but 
short-lived and poignantly discriminatory.86 And, yet, during and immediately after events as 
outrageous as, say, the dark witch hunt conducted by Senator McCarthy, the legal 
imagination was intrigued by two extremely far-sighted observations. Fortuitously short-
circuiting the worlds of the “domestic” and the “international”, Philip Jessup in his Storrs 
Lectures at Yale Law School alluded to the parallels between the legal organizational and 
normative character of a large (domestic) business corporation on the one hand and an 
(international) organization on the other.87 He highlighted the fact that large corporations in 
the economically flourishing Western capitalist world had frequently grown into such 
enormous proportions that power conflicts between its hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders and employees and the company’s management should really be seen as 
comparable with the political sovereignty disputes between nation states. Following from 
this observation, Jessup pointed to the questionable basis on which lawyers tend to readily 
identify the company as a private, but the international organization as a public entity. 
Having learned his lesson from the previous decades of legal and social theory’s developing 
interest in empirical data as essential to the legal enterprise88, Jessup had good reasons to 
make a functional argument through which we learn the name and nature of the beast 
before us.89 Be it Tiger, Lion or Dragon (thus, not an animal per se, but a fairy tale creature), 
they are all dangerous, regardless of their name. 
 
A year earlier, one of American corporate legal theory’s poster children90, Adolf Berle, 
penned the already alluded to chapter on the “city of god”, in which he depicted the 
domestic and global dimension of business firms as “quasi-public”. The little book, which like 
Jessup’s lectures two years later, were first presented as part of the Storrs Lectures at Yale, 
met with great interest among social theory informed lawyers and political scientists but fell 
flat with that strand of the “law and society” surge, which would ultimately prove to be the 
most successful prodigy: The “law and economics” prairie fire that soon spread around U.S. 
and eventually Western world law schools and policy making departments91, had little 
                                                        
85 See the fascinating portrait of the consequences of this development by the turn of the 19th/20th century in 
R. Musil, The Man Without Qualities (orig. German, 1921-1941). 
86 J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1958); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); J. R. Feagin/B. 
McNair Barnett, 'Success and Failure: How Systemic Racism Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision', 
(2004) Illinois Law Review 1099-1130. 
87 P. C. Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956); for a more extensive discussion, see, e.g., C. 
Tietje/A. Brouder/K. Nowrot, Philip C. Jessup's Transnational Law Revisited (Essays in Transnational Law 
No.50/2006) 2006), and P. Zumbansen, 'Transnational Law, Evolving', in J. Smits (ed) Elgar Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law (2nd ed.) (Edward Elgar, 2012), 898-925 [http://ssrn.com/abstract=1975403]. 
88 J. Dewey, 'The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality', (1926) 35 Yale Law Journal 655-673. 
89 For a similar argument in adapting modern administrative law to complex societal demands, see J. Willis, 
'Three Approaches to Administrative Law: The Judicial, the Conceptual, and the Functional', (1935) 1 UTLJ 53-81. 
90 A. A. Berle/G. C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property [1932]. With a new introduction by 
Murray Weidenbaum & Mark Jensen (Transaction Publishers, 1991). 
91 B. R. Cheffins, 'The Trajectory of (Corporate) Law Scholarship', (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 456-506. 
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sympathies for a “re-embeddedness” of the firm92 and for a contextualization of business 
enterprises in a heavily regulated welfare state.93 Instead, the declared goal was one of 
remembering Hayek’s 1944 epistle on ‘The Road to Serfdom’94, but to forget Polanyi’s ‘Great 
Transformation’, written the same year.95  
 
Meanwhile, Jessup and Berle are important reminders for a strand in legal thinking that was 
always acutely aware of the “bigger picture”, of the precariousness of a normative order 
and of the false promises of a legal universe which is constantly being woven and re-woven 
through abstract principles against ideological smoke-screens, but inherently built on the 
suppressed or ignored empirical data of a different, conflictual social reality.96 The interest 
jurisprudes in Berlin97, the legal realists in New York and California98, the legal 
anthropologists and sociologists in Vienna, Madison, and Cambridge had persistently 
pointed out the need to empirically ground and test all legal assertions.99 But, “law and 
society” evolved as one thing, while “law and economics” evolved as another, quite another 
indeed.100 
 
Still, and despite all this, our students, burdened with college and graduate school debt and 
painfully aware of dwindling job opportunities, rightly demand to be well trained. Given the 
here described background, it is clear that we should give them what they are asking for. 
But, there is little time, three years on average, maybe less, to train the – critical101, skilled102, 
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ethical103, and, yes, transnational104 – lawyer. Train her how? And, for what? The litany of 
more than 150 years of legal education reform is not something that today’s students are 
usually aware of, nor would they be very interested, if they were.  But, really, why should 
they? As long as we continue to feed them cases, ‘notes and questions’, as if most of the law 
was ‘business as usual’, spiced infrequently by a shy glance at recent developments, it is 
unlikely that we can really fruitfully build on and transform the ‘case method’ – and no one 
should say we haven’t been trying.105 So, why should students care, if most of us don’t 
(really, as in ‘seriously’) care? 
 
In a strange zone of consciousness (and, admittedly, shrewed and ultimately unsatisfying 
self-rightenousness) one may, at times, dwell in Holmes’ iteration that a law student one 
may still hope to “connect your subject with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a 
glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal law”.106 So, maybe then, one 
turns to privatize such endeavours and begins to treat them as luxuries that can at best be 
enjoyed in those (in fact, never coming) quiet, rainy Sunday afternoons, during which the 
imagination should be nourished so that we may hope to finally inspire the students who 
have been waiting too long already. Meanwhile, the school’s administration recruits once 
more a “moderator” and “team leader” to guide a largely under-researched brain-storming 
session on “what is wrong with legal education” (but without the reference to Llewellyn107 
we might just too quickly believe we ‘discovered’ this problem). We listen, more or less 
attentively, and try not to get too distracted by the moderator’s irritating use of jargon that, 
in the end, must fail to sweeten the sour taste of us realizing that sessions like this cannot be 
the right way to get the ‘bigger picture’ back into the class room. They are too much focused 
on “engaging” students but too little on facilitating a discussion among instructors of the 
larger goals of such engagement. They tend to emphasize the need to use a variety of digital 
media to make the material more ‘accessible’ to today’s law school audience too much in a 
self-serving manner, while failing to connect the (good!) idea of the “digital classroom” with 
the much needed engagement with the deeper concerns regarding decreasing 
opportunities to read and to discuss in class overarching, systematic and foundational 
materials. So, it’s mostly back to business as usual. The binder with the “materials” from the 
faculty day on legal education, use of electronics in the classroom and, yes, of course, on 
ways to internationalize the law school, goes into the shelf, where it shall stay until one fine 
day. And, all the while, one always finds a few students who are eager to meet for regular 
explorations of the books and discussions that – let’s admit it – first got ourselves excited 
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about the law. Too seldom do such reading circles expand beyond a faculty convenor and 
students to include other colleagues. Where are they?  
 
What, then, is to become of our excitement over the prospects of possibly doing it all 
differently, with new knowledge, methods and with fresh energy? What follows after our 
being intrigued by ideas of teaching the law through Business School-like case studies? 
Where will we store the newspaper clippings we keep on collecting throughout the 
semester in the hope to find a good moment to build an entire syllabus around the stories 
that arise from these snippets? And, what should we do with them? 
 
Case- and problem-oriented legal education, complemented by some basic bigger picture 
sketching by way of history, theory and political economy, could very well be a promising 
approach. It could be a way to effectively invite the students to think about what makes a 
case, in other words, it could be a method of replacing the ‘teaching’ of four to five cases 
per class unit by a different kind of instruction. 
 
After presenting the outlines of a typical conflict and its prima facie rendering through a 
legal lens, we could engage the students in an exercise of unpacking the choice and 
interpretation of facts that resulted in the legal reconstruction of the original conflict, 
problem, event. In a next step, we would have to trace the way in which different parties 
engaged – successfully? – in formulating and mobilizing arguments. Following a (Legal 
Realist) analysis of what was actually said and conveyed beyond and underneath the words 
spoken by the parties, we would have to take a step back and appreciate how little of the 
context in which the ‘case’ is situated has in fact so far become tangible. Trying to 
understand the ‘time’ and the ‘place’ and ‘space’ of the case, we are likely to discover 
previously hidden layers of social interaction, circumstance and coincidences, longstanding 
practices as well as entrenched positions from which stakeholders operate – which were 
invisible before. We will be confronted with the problem that our depiction of what is 
‘relevant’ and what isn’t is, ultimately, based on choice. The complex nature of 
understanding a case108 in this light is only rarely discussed in class. The conclusive depiction 
of a conflict, dispute or problem in the language of a legal decision has already superseded 
the underlying choices.109 The task for the class room is seems to be to slow down this 
appropriation of reality by unfolding the space in which a lawyer will actually operate – most 
often with the goal of never going before court and even less, having to anxiously await 
“what the courts will do in fact”. It is in this sphere between context and case that students 
will actually have to begin to think like a lawyer, that is, like someone who is in charge of and 
responsible and accountable for the way in which facts get selected and organized, 
weighed, highlighted or discarded. In fact, we ought to try to involve them in a discussion 
which is much more akin to what most of our graduates will do in practice, namely, identify 
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leads, pick out and justify relevant facts, construct a narrative, strategize, and, along the 
entire way, make hard choices. Reading cases and testing students on holdings and 
principles is – despite our self-congratulatory claims of how “past” we think Langdell 
supposedly is – still the way we continue to teach them. Today’s curricula are painfully 
divided between case-method instruction (requiring above all a master-mind in extracting, 
organizing and administering a maze of new information) and increasing surges in 
experiential training. 
 
The relevant/irrelevant divide we just identified for cases, and for the cases underneath and 
around them, in the usual context of law school education, mostly unfolds with view to 
domestic law. But, the here identified challenge to make students aware of the context in 
which law separates relevant from irrelevant facts, demarcates between interests and ranks, 
prioritizes and selects values, presents itself in an even more striking way in the 
transnational problem-examples we referred to above.  
 
Is the case of the Muslim prayer in Berlin a “domestic” one? Does it have any relevance from 
a transnational perspective? Would it be helpful for a student (in a German law school) to 
study this case along with the 2009 referendum in Switzerland over the rights of Muslim 
religious groups to erect minarets? Is it connected to challenges arising before French courts 
regarding parents asking their Muslim school children to be exempted from co-educational 
physical education? What would the course be, in which one could make all these 
connections? “Transnational constitutional law”? Would the “constitutional law” framework 
be enough to capture the other dimensions of these cases? In order to understand the legal 
challenges that arise from increasingly complex, pluralist transnational societies, is it enough 
to study a series of court decisions from this or that jurisdiction? Would we not have to look 
at developments going on within social communities in terms of self-organization and 
positioning? Would we not be advised to study the emergence of religious freedom rights 
“from the ground up”, in order to avoid having to apply yesterday’s law to today’s changed 
world?110 
 
With a view of the wide-ranging field of transnational human rights litigation111, what lessons 
does the Kiobel case hold for students not enrolled in either “International Human Rights” 
or “Conflict of Laws”?112 Would it be helpful, perhaps even important for First-year students 
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in Tort law to study such a case?113 What could the effect be of introducing students to the 
potential use of tort law in such a context? How helpful could it be to draw out the many 
different legal fields that are in fact at work in cases such as Kiobel? To the degree that we 
see tort, contract, labor, constitutional law, human rights and conflict of laws at work, 
where in today’s law school curriculum would there be the adequate place to draw out 
these dimensions so that a graduating student, with an employment in a law firm 
representing one of the defendants (or, plaintiffs), would know “where to start” when 
having to advise the senior partner on “what the law is”, after the (defendant) client called 
to seek help “to make this problem go away” viz. the (plaintiff) group stating that they 
“have tried everything” and don’t know what to do now.114 
 
Would the solution be a “new” course. A course in what? And where should it be placed in 
the curriculum? And who should ideally teach the course? Could the solution be 
“collaborative” teaching? Could it be that teachers in the same area (contracts, torts, crim, 
property) are asked to sit down together and with international lawyers, human rights 
activists, advocacy group lawyers etc, to compare and rethink their course programs? 
Imagine that. Could it be, that professors had to begin to speak to each other? To discuss 
what they have been doing all along, and how? Could it be that they themselves, not a 
moderator, had to share their research amongst each other in order to facilitate a real 
discussion over what is out there and how it can be brought to bear on what we will do in 
our courses and seminars once the new term rolls around? Could it be, that we have to start 
coming more often to our office, actually spend time there and eventually run into our 
colleagues, perhaps even in such a clumsy way in the hallway that we make them drop their 
papers, one of which might be one they were just reading. We could say: “What are you 
reading?” And, we could just see the magic unfold from there. 
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